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as causes is to misunderstand their sequence. Individual associations, affective sympathy, and a feeling that a general conception of life is embodied in the stimulating object, are always accompaniments of the æsthetic attitude, but these again are not causes. They are disproportionate and arbitrary, and also not peculiar to the appreciation of beauty. They are 'anæsthetic.' The æsthetic feelings proper can scarcely be called feelings, but are rather ways of thinking and habitual processes. They are feelings of æsthetic play, of technical superiority, and of harmony. The author emphasizes the fact that play is a luxury, a discipline, and an illusion; and the same is true of art. It can only flourish where there is a margin of time amidst the struggle for life, a luxurious surplus. It lays down its own rules, as does play, and is concerned with the appearance, and not with the practical reality. Moreover, any æsthetic theory which ignores the facts of technique, the art development, the schools, the fashions of painting and composing by which we judge a Giotto or a Gregorius, destroys its own value. Harmony also is essential to æsthetic enjoyment and includes the harmony of the technique with the idea and with itself.

The author recognizes that our consciousness is a unity, but denies that moral and æsthetic ideals coincide. Both have disciplines of their own, but art, based as it is on luxury, bound up in its own technique, dealing with appearances, a refuge from practical reality, has its own conscience, and it is needless confusion to affirm that goodness and beauty are identical. Art cannot run too much counter to morals, for our personalities are unitary; and art objects cannot be as universal as moral acts, for life cannot have such a balance of luxury. Art has its own domain, and to more accurately define it is the task of future æsthetics.

M. Lalo has stated his subject well, and kept to his main problem with admirable method. The critical portion is very forcefully put, and the great value of the latter portion lies in emphasizing the need for a scientific æsthetics, based upon a careful study of actual beauty, and in pointing out the weakness of theorists who destroy their own field by merging it with ethics, who are not willing to analyze critically the objects of which they speak, and who therefore confuse rather than elucidate their subject.

There is a slight difficulty to English readers in the fact that the French *sentiment* and *sentimentalisme* have no fixed equivalents in English. Feeling and emotion, already somewhat loosely used in English, may both be included under the term *sentiment*, and an occasional ambiguity results. With this exception, the book is lucidly clear, and its object and method admirable.

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Eraclito, testimonianze e frammenti. Di EMILIO BODRERO. Torino, Fratelli Bocca, 1910.—pp. xxxii, 212.

The scholastic literature of Italy is admittedly deficient in works on the early Greek philosophers (la bibliografia italiana della filosofia chiamata

presocratica è . . . scarsa, . . . p. 80), and the little book before us is an attempt to supply partially this want. Accordingly it is not meant for the interlingual specialist or the historian of Greek philosophy *von Fach*. The latter finds after all, and will continue to find for some time to come, the best part of his material in German. Our author has a humbler aim, if we judge from the heights of the German specialist, namely, to present the work of Heraclitus—as much as is extant of and about Heraclitus—in Italian garb for Italian readers. But as the heights of the German specialist are not the only heights from which to contemplate ancient philosophy, even that part of it which has come down in fragments; as, in fact, some would not think them heights at all, our author does not regard his aim or his task as humble in any sense.

He has very positive tendencies in philosophy, or rather very positive views on the function of philosophy, which color whatever philological or historical work he may do. Accordingly we have a rather lengthy dedicatory epistle to Doctor Erminio Troilo, teacher of theoretical philosophy in the University of Rome, breathing the spirit of the *Schöngeist*, and deploring the impersonal and non-spiritual, the purely critical and analytical, character of modern philosophy (p. v). He is of the opinion that the *ego* must subject the *non-ego*, and not the contrary. He maintains without blushing (*e non ne arrossisco*) that philosophy must remain in a certain sense poetry, and reveal and unfold every virtue, instead of being limited to method and being forced to pick up the crumbs from the table of the sciences (pp. vi f.). He even goes so far as to say that he is one of those who prefers an agreeable lie to a sad truth, and if removing the veil which conceals all the pain of nothing (*del nulla*), should cost him the loss of the most insignificant of his illusions, he would choose to remain as he is with his ignorance, but at the same time with all the purity of his fallacious ideal, which at least he, and he alone, has constructed for himself (p. xxi).

He imagines he sees in Heraclitus a kindred spirit, and nothing daunted by the possible charge of being a “lodator del tempo passato,” he does not hesitate to seek repose in the phantasies, so profound and so incomparably beautiful, of the progenitors of philosophy, in order through them to try to increase as well as he can whatever value his own personality may represent (p. xxii).

There follows then a bibliography of Heraclitus complete to 1908, which is really a valuable thing for the student. Then comes a long introduction of eighty-two pages entitled “The Presocratic Philosophy and Heraclitus of Ephesus,” in which all sorts of questions about the development of Greek philosophy before Socrates and its relation to Oriental thought are discussed, and various phases of Heraclitus’s personality and teaching are touched upon. The only comment the present reviewer wishes in all humility to make on the introduction is that in the matter of conciseness, directness, definiteness, and precision it leaves a great deal to be desired. Such diffuse, warm, and romantic introductions are suitable to a great many minds, but not, I think, to him who wishes to get away with a clear and definite idea succinctly expressed. But

perhaps this is exactly the critical and impersonally and unfeelingly analytical character of modern philosophy which the author deploras so much.

The rest of the book is devoted to the Italian translation of Heraclitean texts. This is divided into four parts. The first three are taken from Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, and consist of (1) Testimonies on the life and teaching of Heraclitus; (2) Fragments of Heraclitus Concerning Nature; (3) Imitations, containing for the most part a quotation from Pseudo-Hippocrates, *De victu*. The fourth part is based on Bywater, *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiæ*, Appendix V, and contains the Pseudo-Heraclitean epistles. The text of the fragments is that of Diels and the translation for the most part is also based upon Diels. The author even takes over Diels's notes and translates them. The reader of Diels has therefore nothing to learn from Bodrero. In fact, there are instances where Bodrero, in taking liberties with Diels's note and truncating it, has left it meaningless. Thus Fragment 45 reads in Diels's text, *ψυχῇ πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξείρωο*. . . . In his note he says "πειραταιον BF: πειρατέον P. πείρατα durch Tertullians (*de an.* 2) Übersetzung *terminos* gegeben; ἰὼν bessert' ich: . . ." This is all very clear. The MSS. have *πειραταιον* or *πειρατέον*, which do not make sense. Diels finds the word *terminos* in Tertullian, which suggests to him *πείρατα* as the reading (so already Bywater), and he explains *πειραταιον* of BF as representing an original *πείρατα ἰὼν*. Bodrero's note taken from Diels reads as follows: "Secondo la traduzione di Tertulliano (*de an.* 2) *πείρατα* = *terminos*. Il Diels ha corretto ἰὼν. . . ." Bodrero has not the Greek text in his edition, only the Italian translation, and as in the note he leaves out the MS. reading, it makes no sense. That Tertullian in his translation renders *πείρατα* by *terminos* is of no earthly interest to anybody, and is not what Diels's note means to say.

A few other oversights may be noted here.

Fragment 10, *ἴσως δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, κ. τ. λ.*, *ἴσως* is rendered "inaccurately *parimenti* (p. 115). It means *probably*, not *equally* or *similarly*. Fragment 65, *χρησμοσύνη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ διακόσμησις κατ' αὐτόν*, is incorrectly rendered "la mancanza è l'ordinarsi del mondo secondo il fuoco" (p. 135). *Κατ' αὐτόν* cannot refer to *πῦρ*, which is neuter. Diels translates correctly *nach ihm*. Fragment 109, note, Bodrero renders Diels's "spielerisch," which means 'playfully', by the word "ironica," which is not the same thing.

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I massimi problemi. Di BERNARDINO VARISCO. Milano, Libreria Editrice Milanese, 1910.—pp. xii, 331.

There is much in this work of Signor Varisco which will well repay the reader. It is a serious and careful presentation of the philosophic faith of an earnest and capable thinker,—a convinced idealist who believes that the loftiest and most abstruse problems, which for many centuries have formed the subject of human speculation, are susceptible of a permanent and satisfactory solution. Adverse criticism of a work undertaken in this spirit does not necessarily